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Documentation Index

Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://radarhq.io/docs/llms.txt

Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

When a Cloud user clicks into a cluster, the Hub injects their identity onto the request and the in-cluster Radar pod (running with --auth-mode=proxy) impersonates them on the K8s API. Per-user RBAC just works - via standard K8s impersonation, not a custom permission system.

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The header contract

For every request through the tunnel, the Hub:
  1. Strips inbound X-Forwarded-* to prevent spoofing.
  2. Injects:
    • X-Forwarded-User: <user_id> (e.g. user_01HF...)
    • X-Forwarded-Groups: cloud:<role>,cloud:org:<org_id>,cloud:user:<user_id>
<role> is one of owner, member, viewer - the user’s Cloud role in the org that owns the cluster. The in-cluster Radar (under RADAR_CLOUD_MODE=true) is forced to --auth-mode=proxy with these header names pinned. The chart enforces this; you can’t override it without un-cloud-mode-ing the in-cluster Radar.

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The default RBAC

The chart ships three ClusterRoleBindings out of the box:
Cloud roleImpersonated as groupBound to ClusterRole
Ownercloud:owneradmin (K8s built-in)
Membercloud:memberedit (K8s built-in)
Viewercloud:viewerview (K8s built-in)
K8s itself decides what each ClusterRole permits. view is read-only for namespaced resources. edit adds writes. admin adds RBAC operations.

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Overriding the defaults

The chart’s cloud.defaultRbac.* block lets you swap each binding: 
# values.yaml for the in-cluster Radar
cloud:
  enabled: true
  url: wss://api.radarhq.io/agent
  clusterName: cl_xxx
  existingSecret: radar-cloud-token
  defaultRbac:
    create: true                       # set false to skip all three bindings
    owner: true                        # emit cloud:owner binding
    member: true
    viewer: true
    ownerClusterRole: cluster-admin    # ClusterRole each binding maps to
    memberClusterRole: edit
    viewerClusterRole: view
To disable a binding entirely (e.g. you want only owners to have access, no members or viewers): 
cloud:
  defaultRbac:
    member: false
    viewer: false
Members and viewers will then hit 403s when they try to do anything in the cluster. The Cloud UI still shows the cluster in the list - it’s the K8s API that’s saying no.

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Per-user bindings

If you need finer control than role-level (e.g. specific user can edit deployments but only in apps/* namespaces), bind directly to the per-user group: 
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: alice-apps-edit
  namespace: apps-prod
subjects:
  - kind: Group
    name: cloud:user:user_01HF...     # user_id from Settings → Tokens or audit log
    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: edit
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
Find a user’s user_id in:
  • The audit log row metadata.
  • The user’s PAT page (their own ID is shown at the top).
  • Owner’s view of Settings → Organization → Members (hover the row).

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Per-org bindings

Every request also carries cloud:org:<org_id> in the groups header. This is mostly useful for clusters that move between orgs - typically you wouldn’t need to bind to it directly. But if you ever need “any user from this org can do X”, that’s the hook.

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Auditing what the in-cluster Radar did

K8s itself logs impersonated requests in audit.k8s.io if you’ve enabled the audit policy on the apiserver. The user ID and groups are present in the audit log entry, so you can correlate “user X did Y” against the Cloud audit log (which shows control-plane actions) and the K8s audit log (which shows in-cluster actions).

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Things to watch out for

  • Default admin is broad. It can read Secrets, mutate RBAC, drain nodes. If you have non-admin owners, swap cloud:owner to a custom ClusterRole.
  • view doesn’t see Secrets. That’s K8s view definition, not ours. If you want viewers to see Secret names without values, use a custom ClusterRole that grants get/list on secrets (which lets them see Secret data too - K8s doesn’t have field-level RBAC). Since Secret data is redacted by Radar before display, this is usually safe but think it through.
  • Helm write needs more than edit. Helm install / upgrade / rollback / uninstall need broad write access, including Secrets (Helm releases are Secrets). The chart’s default member → edit is intentionally not enough for Helm writes; opt in via a custom binding if you want members to manage Helm.

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See also